By J. R. Felton, O.B.E.

H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines

Presented by the Secretary of Mines to Parliament
by Command of His Majesty
May, 1937

Table Of Contents

To Captain Harry Crookshank, M.P.,
Secretary for Mines.

Sir,

In accordance with your directions, I have the honour to submit the following Special Report on the explosion which occurred at Markham Colliery, No. 1 Pit, on the 21st January, 1937, by which seven persons were killed and five persons were injured. Of the latter, two subsequently succumbed to their injuries, making the total death roll nine.

Inquest Proceedings.

Inquests on the bodies of the nine deceased men were held at the County Police Court, Chesterfield, before H.M. District Coroner (Dr. R. A. McCrea) and a jury on the 18th and 19th February, when the following were present :—

Evidence as to the cause of death in each case having been given by Drs. J. B. McKay and H. T. Herring, the circumstances attending the explosion were fully investigated, ample opportunity being afforded by the Coroner to all parties to bring forward any evidence relevant to the inquiry. In all 23 witnesses were examined.

At the conclusion of the Inquests the jury returned the following verdict :—

“The deaths were accidentally caused by an unforeseen combination of abnormal conditions, that is, an accumulation of gas which was exploded by a flame which escaped from a cutting machine box caused by a faulty replacement of the cover plate. The jury is satisfied that every precaution and provision has been and is taken by the Staveley Coal and Iron Co. Ltd. to ensure the safety of the men working in their mines”.

Description Of The Colliery

Markham Colliery is one of three large collieries owned by the Staveley Coal and Iron Co. Ltd., and is situated some five miles from Chesterfield. Mr. John Hunter is the General Manager for the whole of the collieries, Mr. R. Ringham being the Agent and Mr. L. W. Limb the Manager of the Markham Colliery.

This colliery comprises four shafts, of which Nos. 1 and 2 are downcasts, and Nos. 3 and 4 upcasts. Four seams are being worked, and coal from the Blackshale seam, in which the explosion occurred, is wound at No. 1 shaft.

Altogether the colliery employs 1,828 persons below ground and 410 on the surface.

Ventilation is produced by two Waddle fans, one at No. 3 shaft and the other at No. 4, and at the date of the last recorded readings the total quantity of air circulated in all seams was 189,500 cu. ft. per minute. For the Blackshale seam alone the quantity was 66,200 cu. ft. per minute.

Safety lamps were used throughout the mine. At the face electric hand lamps were in use, and a proportion of the workmen — in excess of that required by the General Regulations (Firedamp Detectors) of 1st May, 1935 — were provided with flame safety lamps and “Ringrose” automatic firedamp detectors. Further reference will be made to this matter later.

The colliery is wholly mechanized, the coal-cutters and conveyors being driven by electricity; shot-holes, however, are drilled by compressed air.

The Blackshale Seam

It was in the No. 2 Development Unit, South-East District, of this seam that the explosion took place. The seam lies at a depth of 700 yards from the surface, and has an average thickness of 4 ft. 3 in. with an overlying dirt band or “flamper” eight inches thick.

The No. 2 unit (see Plan 1) comprises a longwall face the length of which at the time of the explosion was 192 yards, viz. :— 72 yards on the left side of the main loader and haulage gate and 120 yards on the right of that gate.

In each bank there was a belt conveyor delivering to a gate end loader in the centre gate.

The loader gate was the main intake and, on reaching the face, the air split right and left, the right split returning down the right tail gate and the left split travelling partly by way of the left tail gate and partly by way of No. 9’s face, these two latter currents joining in the No. 2 return gate outbye of No. 9 left hand airway (see Plan 2). Two hurdle sheets placed in the left tail gate regulated the quantity passing down that gate and directed the air up into the ripping lip. No. 9 conveyor face had not been worked for some six weeks prior to the explosion.

The width of the loader gate between packs was 12 feet and of the tail gates ten feet, a face ripping six feet thick being carried in the former, and in the latter five feet thick.

The rate of advance of the face was about 25 feet per week, the depth of undercut being five feet, the cutting on this face being done by two machines. The sequence of operations is :— day shift — filling coal; afternoon shift — cutting and filling holings; night shift — ripping, turning over, packing and timber drawing. Shots are fired in both coal and rippings, the average number fired per day being 26 and 12 respectively; coal shots are fired on the day shift and ripping shots at nights.

On No. 2 face 37 persons were employed on the day shift, 20 on afternoons and 32 on the night shift. There was a deputy on each shift, and a shot-firer on the day shift.

The quantity of air entering this district as measured in the intake 100 yards from the face on 8th January and recorded in the air measurement book was 11,600 cu. ft. per minute, and on the same day the measurement in the right tail gate gave 2,800 cu. ft. per minute. No measurement was taken in the left tail gate or on the No. 9 face.

A month earlier the corresponding readings were 13,500 and 3,850 cu. ft. per minute respectively. At the inquest the head surveyor said these measurements were based on the actual velocities recorded by the anemometer and made no allowance for friction; when adjusted in accordance with the makers’ chart they would become 11,890 and 3,310 for the 8th January, and for the month of December the quantity in the intake would be 13,840 cu. ft. per minute.

During the three months preceding the explosion the presence of firedamp in the No. 2 unit was reported on twelve occasions as follows:—

It will be observed that most of these reports refer to the finding of firedamp in the left hand gate or gate lip, but that on the 17th and 18th January a small percentage was reported as “giving off at 2’s left rib side.” In evidence it was explained that the gas was being given off at roof breaks.

On the 11th November, Thomas Barley, a stallman working at the top end of the face, found a small percentage of gas in a pot-hole near the corner when inspecting at the beginning of his shift, and reported this to the deputy; it was cleared as stated in the deputy’s report.

In the general body of the air on this face no firedamp had ever been found, and evidence was given to show that at no time had the presence of firedamp been indicated on any flame lamp or automatic detector on the face: the occasions above mentioned refer to the finding of gas at breaks and/or pot-holes.

Conditions Before The Explosion

On the day of the explosion the day shift men were engaged in filling off the undercut coal and timbering up the face (steel props and bars used as supports) as the coal was extracted, 11 colliers and three contractors being in the left bank. The three contractors (one of whom was Frank Mansell) were normally employed in 9’s main gate — “scouring” a road through from the loader gate to the left tail gate — but had been sent into the left bank to deal with a “roll” which at the time was crossing that face. This roll partially cut out the seam and restricted the height in the bank, and these men (as were others on two previous shifts) were engaged in enlarging the area at this point.

The regular day shift deputy (Leslie Stevens) having gone to the Central Rescue Station for his quarterly practice, Willis Fish, a shot-firer and spare deputy, was in charge of No. 2 unit on the day of the accident. He arrived at the face about 7 a.m. and first examined the left bank and then the right bank; tests for firedamp, he stated, were made in the left bank at various places, including the wastes, the left tail gate lip, the left hand top corner and eight yards down 9’s face, but none was found. At that time he noticed a break over the coal-cutter, which stood in the top corner, but it was not giving off gas. Similarly the loader gate lip and the right bank were inspected and found clear.

At about 9.30 a.m. the deputy attended to some matters in the loader gate, and then proceeded by way of 7’s main gate up 2’s left tail gate to the face, The two regulator cloths in this gate were seen to be in order. From the tail gate he then proceeded into the top corner and travelled the whole of 9’s face, returning the same way to 2’s face and along the left bank of that face to the loader gate. There was then no fall on 9’s face and no gas was there found.

Later the right bank was again inspected as also was the right side airway to 6’s main gate, and thence he returned up the loader gate to the face spending some time with the shotfirer (John Dowds) en route.

On the face there were eight “Ringrose” automatic gas detectors, two in the left bank and six in the right bank; two of the latter had been taken in by men moved from other faces. There were also a number of flame safety lamps used as detectors on this face, of which at least four went into the left bank.

Having again examined the right bank another examination of the left bank was commenced about 1 p.m., starting from the loader gate. This examination extended to the top corner and 20 yards down 9’s face, also into the left tail gate a few yards, and all was in order as before, the ventilation taking its normal course and indicating no noticeable change, except that the break on 2’s face was a little more pronounced.

When the deputy left the top corner (at about 1.35 p.m. he estimated) Edmund Smith was the only man working there and he was setting supports. He had with him a “Ringrose” automatic gas detector which was hung on a bar within five yards of the corner and over the belt race. The coal in the top stints having been filled out, four men (including two of the deceased) were moved down near the roll to assist in filling off some remaining coal there. The deputy again went into the right bank and on his way saw the left bank coal-cutter men in the loader gate getting their trailing cable ready, after which he returned to the men near the roll and finally left them completing their timbering preparatory to going home.

Fish had once more gone down the right bank to see that all was being left in order at the end of the shift, and was about 40 yards from the loader gate when he felt a rush of air and heat, an interruption of the ventilation followed by smoke and dust; he saw no flame and heard no report.

John Dowds was the shot-firer on No. 2 conveyor face and between 6.45 and 11.30 a.m. on the day of the accident fired 22 shots, which included three shots in the roll on the left bank at about 9 a.m. In no case did he detect the presence of firedamp in his examinations before or after the firing of these shots. The nearest shot to the left tail gate was about 24 yards lower down the face, and this was fired at 8 o’clock. In the course of the shift he had no occasion to go into the top corner, nor did he go into the left tail gate.

When the explosion occurred Dowds was in the right bank about 25 yards below the loader gate; he felt a rush of wind down the face, but was not injured in any way.

The evidence of Dowds eliminates any possibility of the explosion having originated through the firing of a shot.

During the morning the left bank was also visited by the day shift overman, Albert Edward Brown. Starting from the loader gate at about 10 o’clock he travelled up the left bank as far as the top corner where he tested for gas and found none. He also went into the left tail gate where he found the hurdle sheets in order and the ripping lip clear of firedamp. One sheet was five feet from the lip and the second about four yards further outbye.

At that time the ventilation appeared to be satisfactory and taking its normal course. He noticed a “Ringrose” detector hung up about eight feet from the top corner, and there was also a flame safety lamp between the corner and the tail gate. After spending some time on the roads the overman returned to the pit bottom which he reached at 1 p.m.

The last man to leave the top end of the left bank before the explosion was Herbert Smith, a stallman on the day shift, and his evidence is of considerable importance.

Smith worked in the third stint from the top, i.e. almost opposite the left tail gate; he was supplied with a flame safety lamp, as well as an electric lamp, and this he hung on a bar near to where he worked. By about 1 p.m. he had filled out his stint, and the deputy asked him to give a hand to Slater, the man below him: he stayed with Slater until about 2.30 p.m. Meanwhile (at about 1.45 p.m.) the cutter men (F. Roddy and L. Cadywould) arrived, and Smith helped them to get the trailing cable along the face up to the machine. Some 15 minutes later when Smith from his position down the face was looking towards the top, end he saw a flash and heard a crack from the machine which appeared to come from near the pommel end.

Shortly afterwards Roddy came down the face and as he passed Smith the latter asked what was the matter, to which Roddy replied, “The machine has burst.” After being away some little time Roddy returned, and in answer to Smith’s inquiry as to what he was going to do said, “Try it again.” A similar conversation took place between Walter Frost, another man in the face, and Roddy.

Confirmation of this occurrence at the machine was also given by Frank Mansell, one of the three contractors normally engaged in driving No. 9’s main gate scouring, but who on the day of the accident had been working at the roll. According to this witness Roddy and Cadywould arrived at the face about 1.30 p.m. and the contractors helped them to get the cable along the face. Cadywould later returned and asked the contractors to leave a shovel for him when they went out. This they forgot to do, but when dressing in 9’s scouring just after 2.30 p.m. Cadywould came to them again to get the shovel.

Before he left Cadywould said, “We have had a blue flame flash out of the side of the cutter,” and Mansell told him to tell Roddy to leave the cutter alone until someone had attended to it. W. Hardwick, a fitter, who also heard the remark, told Cadywould to get an electrician to the machine before working it again. There was, in fact, an electrician at the sub-station less than 300 yards away. Cadywould made no reply, but left with the shovel.

Herbert Smith having finished his work went to the tail gate (where his clothes were), dressed and proceeded outbye by that gate: he arrived at the pit bottom without knowing of the explosion, which must have occurred not more than ten minutes after he left the face. When he passed through the sheets in the tail gate they were in order, and he said he left them undisturbed.

Whilst working in his stint Smith had noticed a “Ringrose” detector hanging over the belt race towards the top corner, and this did not come into action during the shift nor did anything occur to suggest any abnormality in the ventilation. The detector was in charge of Edmund Smith who worked in the top stint, but, according to Herbert Smith, Edmund Smith, at about 2.15 p.m., went down the bank to give a hand between Slater and Cauldwell, six to eight yards below the tail gate. Edmund Smith did not take his clothes with him, but whether he took his “Ringrose,” Herbert was unable to state.

The coal-cutter men, as we have seen, reached the face about 1.30 p.m. When they descended at 1 p.m. they were seen at the pit bottom by the overman Brown who, learning that the second man (A. Pitchford) of the team of three usually with the machine had not turned up and that in consequence they had no “Ringrose” with them, told Roddy to use the “Ringrose” already at the face in the charge of E. Smith until a third man (Charles Moreton) who would be sent to join them arrived with another “Ringrose” detector. It should be here noted that no flame safety lamp was taken into the face by the cutter men, although it was stated at the inquest that the practice was for the coal-cutter team to take a “Ringrose” detector and a flame safety lamp with them.

Moreton went inbye with Sydney Smith, the gummer for the right bank cutter; they travelled in together up No. 6’s main gate and into 2’s right hand tail gate, and undressed about 200 yards from the face. Moreton then had a “Ringrose” detector and when he left Smith to proceed to the face (whence he would go up to the left bank) he was carrying this. For some reason, however, this detector never arrived in the left bank; it was, in fact, taken out after the explosion by Walter Bray (a stallman who worked in the winning heading at the extreme right of the face), who found it hung on a bar at the face almost opposite the right tail gate.

Moreton was found dead near the machine along with the two cutter men he had gone to assist; he could not have been in the vicinity of the machine more than a few minutes when the explosion happened.

Narrative Of The Explosion And Rescue Operations

Walter Frost who had been working just above the roll in the left bank had finished work, and at about 2.40 p.m. was putting his clothes on alongside the conveyor about 17 yards above the loader gate when there was a “crack like a shot out of a gun” accompanied by “a blue flame surging round my neck, my face and my legs,” then a cloud of smoke, and he was knocked over. He was severely burned, but crawled down the face to the gate end, then over the loader end and down the main gate as best he could, he being in the dark, and was found by men from the right bank who assisted him outbye; having received attention he was then taken out on a stretcher and sent to hospital.

The flame, said Frost, appeared to come down the face from the top end where the coal-cutter was. Frost carried an oil lamp.

Fred Bassett had also finished work and was in the loader gate facing the coal when there was a bang and a rush of hot air by which he was burned on the left side, neck and arm; the rush came from the left bank.

Of the persons still living these two were the nearest to the scene of the explosion at the time of its occurrence; they were both able to give evidence at the Inquest.

As already stated, the deputy, Willis Fish, was in the right bank 35 to 40 yards below the loader gate, when he felt the rush of air come from the left side followed by dust and heat. As a number of men were working in that bank he at once took them out by the right tail gate and up No. 6’s main gate on to the main plane, after which he proceeded up the loader gate to the face again, where he joined the shot-firer, John Dowds. On the main plane he met R. Warner, an afternoon deputy from an adjoining district, who told him he had already telephoned to notify the manager.

The shot-firer, as we have seen, was about 25 yards down the right bank at the time of the explosion. Accompanied by others Dowds returned to the loader gate, where he saw an oil lamp still burning, and then assisted in rendering first aid to Frost and Bassett. Just beyond the roll Baggaley was found alive partly buried under a fall and was removed and sent out on a stretcher, and close to him was the body of Furniss.

After setting some temporary supports in place of those which had been blown out, and turning on the compressed air to assist the ventilation, another body was found a little farther up the bank. By this time the first Rescue Brigade had arrived at the face.

In the bank near the deceased men the shot-firer noticed two extinguished flame safety lamps.

Brown, the overman, had left the pit, but on arrival home was informed by telephone of the explosion and immediately returned and proceeded below ground and met Mr. Limb (manager) on the main plane near to No. 7’s main gate.

Together they went up 7’s main gate and along 2’s left tail gate to within six yards of 7’s right hand airway where they encountered afterdamp and retreated. Going then up the loader gate they found two stretcher cases being treated, and proceeding up the left bank joined Dowds, Warner and others just before the arrival of the Rescue Brigade.

The Chesterfield Rescue Station received a call at 3.21 p.m. which was immediately answered and by 4.20 p.m. the first team had reached the coal face in No. 2’s loader gate. Proceeding up the left bank in advance of those already there they found two more bodies about ten yards beyond the others. This team got as far as the tail gate, but as practically all the timber in the bank had been knocked out and the roof showed signs of breaking they deemed it wise to withdraw for a consultation in the loader gate. At this stage they were joined by Mr. G. L. Brown (Manager of the Rescue Stations) and the Mansfield Brigade, who had arrived at the colliery shortly after the Chesterfield Brigade.

The three cutter men were still missing, and as they were believed to be near the machine in the top corner it was decided to approach the face by the left tail gate. At No. 7’s right hand airway carbon monoxide and firedamp were encountered, and in the tail gate, between 9’s left hand airway and 9’s main slit, a prop (with some brattice cloth attached) was found on lire and extinguished.

The Mansfield team was sent in to travel to the top corner of 2’s left bank by 9’s face, but were unable to do so owing to a large fall over which air was passing but which it was not possible for men wearing apparatus to get over.

Mr. Brown and the Superintendent then travelled the tail gate alone right to the face, and going up into the top corner the latter found the bodies of the remaining three men lying together close to the face at the back end of the cutter. Near them lay three electric lamps, two still alight and the other unlit. No flame safety lamp was found near this place, nor was there a “Ringrose” detector in the vicinity.

The “Ringrose” detector taken in by E. Smith — whose body was found ten yards above the roll — had been found lying close to the face opposite, but slightly on the low side of, the tail gate.

Mr. J. Hall, Senior Inspector of Mines, having been advised of the explosion, proceeded to the colliery at once and going below ground reached the fresh air base in the No. 2’s airway at 6.10 p.m. where he met Mr. John Hunter, the General Manager. Together they proceeded up the tail gate to the face and arrived just after the bodies of the three cutter men had been removed. A sample of the air taken eight feet from the machine (lower down the bank) showed just under one per cent. of firedamp, but the top corner was foul and over the machine there was an explosive mixture. Returning to the tail gate he found an explosive mixture of firedamp at the ripping lip, to a depth of three feet from the roof. There was a good current of air (augmented by a jet of compressed air from a pipe in the loader gate) passing along the left bank, but as most of it was going down the tail gate (the hurdle sheets having been blown down) instructions were given by Mr. Hunter to erect a brattice to direct it into the top corner.

Mr. Hall travelled down the left bank, and then through the Tight bank — which was found in good order — and returned by the right tail gate.

I arrived at the colliery about 8 p.m. and there found Mr. F. H. Wynne (H.M. Deputy Chief Inspector) who had come from the Company’s Warsop Main Colliery where, as a member of the Committee on the Firedamp Detector Regulations, he had been underground the same afternoon with other members of the Committee.

Shortly after my arrival Mr. Hunter and Mr. Hall returned to the surface and the position was discussed and arrangements made for further investigation. Accompanied by Mr. Hunter, Mr. Limb (Manager), Mr. Cowan (Junior Electrical Inspector) and Mr. H. Hicken (Secretary to the Derbyshire Miners’ Association) I later made an inspection of No. 2 left bank. Firedamp was still present over the coal-cutter, and, running obliquely across the bank from over the machine in the top corner to the face near the tail gate, an open break in the roof was showing from which firedamp was issuing.

On the morning of the 23rd January I again visited the colliery and along with Mr. Hunter, Mr. Limb and Mr. Hicken inspected the whole of No. 9’s face, the fall which, together with the presence of gas, prevented our doing so on the night of the explosion, having been. cleared to make a road through and timber having been erected to secure the roof from which the supports were blown out by the explosion.

Only a superficial examination of the coal-cutter by Mr. Cowan was possible on the night of the explosion, but it was noticed that the switch was in the “off” position. Later the machine and the trailing cable were brought to the surface for detailed inspection and test.

Cause Of The Explosion

The evidence of the survivors and of men working in the right bank, and the position of and injuries sustained by the deceased men (several of whom apparently had moved nearer the loader gate after the explosion), all clearly established that the explosion originated in the left bank and travelled towards the loader gate, the flame extending as far as the roll crossing that face.

Evidence of violence in the bank shown by displaced roof supports, articles of clothing, lamps, etc. indicated the point of origin as being near the top corner. Throughout the length of 9’s face roof supports were blown, out or displaced at various points, and there was slight coking on two or three props between 2’s face and 9’s main slit. In the left tail gate the hurdle sheets at the ripping lip were blown down, and between 9’s main slit and 9’s left hand airway some roof bars were displaced and a prop was found on fire as already explained. The direction of force in these cases, too, was from No. 2’s face.

It was therefore generally agreed that the explosion began in the top corner of 2’s left bank, and radiated there from down 2’s face and along 9’s face and, to a lesser degree, along the left tail gate. It was an explosion of firedamp, and in my opinion coal dust played little part in it. Two samples of dust taken on 9’s face after the explosion showed just over 50 per cent. of combustible matter present, and samples taken on the tail gate contained less than 30 per cent. of combustible matter. Limestone dust was used on the roads.

Igniting Medium

The nine electric lamps and four flame safety lamps issued to the deceased men and to Walter Frost were recovered and sent to the Mines Department Testing Station, Sheffield, where they were examined for defects likely to make them unsafe for use in the presence of firedamp. No defect in any of these was discovered to which an ignition of firedamp and air could be attributed.

Two flame safety lamps taken from the lamp cabin by two of the deceased stall men were unaccounted for, and a prolonged search was made for them on the face and in the wastes. They were later found extinguished about 150 yards from the pit bottom beside clothes belonging to these men, and had never reached the workings.

The “Ringrose” detector issued to E. Smith and later found on the face opposite the left tail gate about twenty yards from the coal-cutter was also examined by Capt. C. B. Platt in the presence of representatives of the Colliery Company and of International Gas Detectors Ltd., the makers of this appliance. It was fitted with a relay and was similar to that approved under the Firedamp Detectors (No. 2) Order, 1935, so that if the red bulb came into action it would remain glowing until turned off. A diagram showing the action of this appliance is given in Figure 2.

Externally it was found to be in good condition, but the carrying hook was bent out of shape suggesting that the detector had been wrenched from its support with some violence.

Further examination showed that the filament of the red bulb was intact and that the relay was in working order; furthermore, the heater filament was ruptured and the diaphragm bent in such a manner that the electrical contact attached to it was no long co-axial with its corresponding fixed contact.

A microscopical examination of the heater filament showed that it had been fused; the appearance of the fused ends is shown enlarged in Figure 1, from which it will be seen that one of the ends is of globular formation.

In Capt. Platt’s view the distortion of the diaphragm and the fusing of the filament in no way caused the apparatus to be capable of igniting an external mixture of firedamp and air, and there was no ground for thinking that the detector was in any but a safe condition up to the time of the explosion. He had little doubt that the distortion of the diaphragm was due to the pressure of the explosion, which would cause it forcibly to contract, and considerable strain of the diaphragm and its associated contacts would result. An experiment carried out with a new detector confirmed this view.

He attributed the fusing of the filament to the presence of a high concentration of firedamp in which the detector had been burning: experiments he carried out showed that 20 per cent. of firedamp or over is required to fuse the filament in a short time (approximately two minutes), but it might be less than 20 per cent, if the filament were glowing in the mixture for a sufficient length of time.

From this evidence I deduce that (1) the “Ringrose” detector was present in a rich mixture of firedamp and (2) it was not the cause of the ignition.

The coal-cutter, which was in the top end of the face, was working between 1.40 p.m. and the time of the explosion, and had cut a little into the rib side in the process of being turned round ready for starting to cut the face.

Shortly after 2p.m. something happened at the machine causing a visible flash following which the machineman went down to the gate-end switch box for some purpose — probably to replace the switch there — stating as he returned that he intended to “try it again”. What was done after this can only be surmised. It is reasonable to assume that either in switching on again or, if the machine was running — probably light as they were getting ready to re-set the anchor prop — in switching off, there was another flash, and this ignited an explosive mixture of firedamp and air surrounding the machine.

The switch was found in the “off” position, and Mr. Allott (Assistant Electrical Engineer) said he later found that in the reverse position it was definitely slow which would have the effect of extending the arc when switching off.

The machine was subjected to a minute examination at the surface by Mr. J. A. B. Horsley and Mr. J. Cowan (Electrical and Junior Electrical Inspectors) in the presence of Prof. I. C. F. Statham (for the Colliery Company) and colliery officials.

At the top flange of the door or cover enclosing the controller compartment there was no measurable gap, and the two side flange gaps could not be measured because of the design. In the bottom flange a feeler of .006 inch could be inserted, but the skid-plate on this type of machine prevented the insertion of a larger feeler and it was therefore not possible to measure this gap properly.

When the cover was carefully removed it was observed that coal and dirt had been trapped in the bottom right corner of the controller casing flange, causing a gap of inch in the flange joint. It was then decided to send the machine to the Mines Department Testing Station at Buxton for test as to whether in that condition it would pass flame, the flange gap being recreated by the insertion of 3/16 inch steel packing.

A preliminary observation test with a nine per cent. firedamp mixture inside the switch was first made, and flame was ejected through the gap at the cover joint. The test was then repeated. in an explosive mixture of 10.2 per cent. firedamp surrounding the machine, upon which external ignition resulted.

A further test under similar conditions was carried out with the metal spacer removed from the cover joint and the cover rebolted up tightly, and no ignition of the external explosive atmosphere occurred.

Plan 3 shows the cover plate and the situation of the dirt.

The presence of this coal and dirt has now to be explained. Two days before the explosion Alfred Thomas Harvey, one of the colliery electricians, visited No. 2’s face and examined the coal-cutter in question, which was then a few yards below the loader gate. He took the door off the switch compartment and examined the switch. The gun carriage was found to be loose, one screw having fallen out, but this was replaced, the other studs tightened, the contacts cleaned and all put in order.

In evidence Harvey said that before replacing the door he cleaned the facings with a piece of rag, and after puffing the door on tightened up the studs securely. He tried the top flange with his feelers, but tried the bottom only by running his fingers round, and was satisfied the door was in order. After this attention the machine cut through to the top end of the face and, this face not being at work on the following day, it remained there untouched until the arrival of the cutter men on the afternoon of the explosion.

Harvey again saw the coal-cutter on the Wednesday (the day before the explosion) and externally it appeared to be all right; the trailing cable and gate end switch gear were then examined and found in order.

It would seem that in replacing the controller door or cover plate, which is a fairly heavy casting, some coal and dirt lying on the floor was scraped up and trapped between the flanges at the bottom corner as afterwards found, and that by reason of its position and the inaccessibility of the bottom for minute examination the presence of this obstruction escaped detection.

It was unfortunate that, having seen the flash from the coalcutter shortly before the explosion and having therefore had warning of its unsafe condition, the men in charge of it decided to “try it again” instead of reporting the defect to the deputy or to an electrician. Had they so reported, the explosion might have been averted.

Presence of firedamp. — The presence of an accumulation of firedamp in the vicinity of the coal-cutter remains to be accounted for.

On both occasions on which deputy Fish visited the left bank during his shift he saw a roof break running diagonally from the face over the machine, and on the second visit at 1.35 p.m. it was a little more pronounced than at the first. As the coal was stripped out roof subsidence would naturally follow tending to open the break, and that this process continued was evidenced by the fact that after the explosion it was found to be much worse, and firedamp was then issuing from it and continued to do so for some time.

In his inspection after the explosion Mr. Hall also found an explosive mixture at the tail gate ripping lip, and an accumulation was present along the inbye end of 9’s face. A sample taken on the following day along this face where the roof was broken seven yards from the machine, and behind a brattice sheet erected to clear the top corner, gave over 58 per cent. of firedamp, and in the air current a little outbye of this there was 2½ per cent.

On the morning of the 23rd January, in a roof cavity extending from the face into the waste at the point (some 30 yards from the machine) where the main fall occurred to which reference has already been made, there was still an explosive mixture, and there was evidence of breaks extending over the gob and packs between 9’s face and the tail gate.

At what time the large fall occurred which was found on 9’s face after the explosion was not definitely established. It was not there at 10.30 a.m., and at 1.35 p.m. the deputy noticed nothing to indicate that any change had taken place. The appearance of the fall suggested that it occurred before and not after the explosion, but in any event there must have been a clear passage from 2’s face along 9’s face at the time of the explosion, and the fact that neither the deputy, nor Herbert Smith (who was working near the top end) nor anyone else noticed any change in the ventilation during the shift seems to indicate that the fall did not materially alter the course of the air current.

In my opinion the fall in conjunction with the break in the top corner is evidence that weighting of the roof was taking place in the area between the tail gate and 9’s face, accompanied by an abnormal emission of gas which the air current was not sufficient to deal with, and this in all probability developed between the deputy’s last visit and the time of the explosion.

Mr. Hall in evidence gave it as his opinion that rather too much of the air travelling up the left bank was getting away down the tail gate over the hurdle sheets (the area over the top of which was given as about nine and a half sq. feet), and while I think (as the officials suggested) that it was necessary and important to course sufficient air over the sheets to keep the gate lip clear, it was still more important to ensure that a good current of air swept the top corner where of all points on the face gas was most likely to collect and in which corner the coal-cutter had to operate.

Mr. Hall also expressed the view that the passage of the roll across the lower end of the left bank restricting the height by 1½ to 2 feet at that point would most probably have the effect of allowing more air to pass down the right bank than normally was the case, which seems to me a reasonable assumption

These circumstances in combination provide a sufficient reason for the accumulation in the top corner of the face.

General Remarks

I think it necessary to make some further observations in regard to two or three matters arising out of this accident.

(1) Electrical Apparatus at the Coal Face.

General Regulation 132 requires that in any part of a mine in which inflammable gas, although not normally present, is likely to occur in quantity sufficient to be indicative of danger, all cables and apparatus shall be constructed, installed, protected, worked and maintained, so that in the normal working thereof there shall be no risk of open sparking. The use of certified flameproof apparatus is not legally required even in safety lamp mines, and this is one of the matters under consideration by the Royal Commission on Safety in Coal Mines. But the question of maintenance is of equal importance. Obviously there can be little value in having any apparatus approved as safe for use unless it is kept in the condition under which the official test showed it to be safe.

In this case the coal-cutter, though ten years old and not of certified flameproof design, did, when tested in an explosive atmosphere with the cover properly closed, fail to ignite the surrounding mixture, but unfortunately the cover was not kept in this condition, partly owing to human failure and partly to the design, which did not permit of such careful gauging of the closeness of the joint as it ought to have had.

Even in machines of much newer design than that in question a similar difficulty is presented. In the manufacture of new machines this point should receive attention, and I suggest that the matter be brought to the notice of coal-cutter makers. It should also be possible, I think, to alter existing machines so as to ensure that after a cover has been taken off and replaced the closeness of the joints can be readily observed and tested in situ. H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines is already considering means by which this may be effected.

(2) Firedamp Detectors.

The Coal Mines General Regulations (Firedamp Detectors), 1935, require that in every ventilating district in which safety lamps are required by the Act or regulations a sufficient number of firedamp detectors of an approved type (in longwall workings not less than one for every eight persons employed at the working faces) shall be provided for use by the workmen employed, and that each such detector shall be in charge of a workman who has been instructed in the method of using, and certified as competent to use, the type of detector provided.

Flame safety lamps and the “Ringrose” automatic firedamp detector have been officially approved by the Mines Department as detectors for the purpose of these regulations, and as already stated, both these types of detectors were in use at Markham Colliery.

The Staveley Coal & Iron Co., Ltd., indeed, were among the first to install the “Ringrose” automatic firedamp detector at their collieries, and since the year 1933 Mr. J. Hunter and his officials have by their investigations and suggestions contributed in no small measure to the improvement of this appliance to its present state of efficiency.

At the date of the explosion 133 “Ringrose” alarms or detectors were in use at Markham Colliery, and every man employed at the face had been instructed in the use of this appliance as well as how to test for gas with a safety lamp.

For each double-unit conveyor face four “Ringrose” detectors and a number of flame safety lamps were provided, two of the former for each bank (one at the end and the other a little distance from the centre gate) with the flame lamps spaced at intervals between these. The system (as explained at the inquest) was for each man appointed to carry a detector (of whatever type) to take it with him from the lamp cabin at the commencement and return it there at the end of the shift; in the event of any of these men being absent the detectors would be sent below ground to the deputy of the district for issue to other workmen.

Every encouragement was given to the workmen to make tests for firedamp and to watch the detectors carefully, the instructions being that if a detector indicated the presence of firedamp the men in the vicinity were to leave the face and report to the deputy at once. On several occasions the red bulb of a “Ringrose” detector has lighted up showing firedamp to be present and the instructions as to withdrawal have been observed; on arrival the deputy found gas present and having removed it the men returned to the face. The man who reported the gas was rewarded for his vigilance, and payment was also made to the workmen for any loss sustained through their withdrawal.

In view of these special precautions, and the attention given to safety matters in general at this colliery by Safety Committees and Safety Officers and the establishment of Fire Stations below ground, the officials naturally considered the possibility of an explosion as extremely remote.

Unfortunately it is not possible to state exactly where the “Ringrose” detector at the top end was hanging at the time of this explosion, but since it was found opposite the tail gate it must have been hanging somewhere between there and the top corner. It was in an explosive atmosphere and in view of its condition when tested appears to have functioned properly, but at what time it gave warning could not be determined.

It may be, as suggested by Mr. Hunter, that the cutter men switched off because they saw the red bulb, glowing; on the other hand, it is not unlikely that, being intent on their work, they failed to notice the detector, especially if it was some distance from them and on the gob side. It should also be noted that the diaphragm masks the red bulb over an angle of nearly 90 degrees, so that from certain angles the warning light may not be easily visible.

The fact remains, however, that there was a hitch in the effective provision and use of the detectors, and that full advantage was not taken of the efforts of the management to provide the best means available for the detection of firedamp as a safeguard against such happenings as this. Even a perfect detector will be of no avail if it is not used, and its warnings promptly acted upon.

This consideration raises the question as to the best position for a detector. Apparently it was customary here for the detector to be placed ahead of the machine somewhere near the anchor prop and moved forward with that prop from time to time, and I understand this is also the practice at other collieries.

In some conditions this may be a satisfactory arrangement, but where as in this case the machine is to cut downhill against the ventilation, I consider the detector should be kept as near the machine as possible if it is to serve the purpose for which it is intended.

Incidentally, the “Ringrose” detectors here were set to operate at two per cent. of firedamp. At this setting the detector does not meet the requirements of General Regulation 132 (v), nor provide the means for compliance with Section 60 (2) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911; to do so it must be set to function at 1¼ per cent., failing which a flame safety lamp must also be provided.

A further point arises. So long as a firedamp detector, whether automatic or flame lamp, is in the nature of a separate appliance additional to the lamp a workman needs to provide light for his work, it is liable to be regarded as an “extra” and treated accordingly, and excellent though the detector may be its object may be defeated by human neglect or failure. A man should always have his detector with him.

It would, in my opinion, be a distinct step forward if a lamp could be designed which combined a good light and an automatic detector in one unit, so that attention to the presence of firedamp would necessarily be directed by a diminution of the light.

I would like to express my thanks to Dr. McCrea, and to the colliery officials and the workmen’s representatives for their assistance in the investigations.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
J. R. Felton.

Appendix

List of Persons Killed

The post 1937 – Official Report into the Disaster appeared first on The Story Mine.

on the causes of, and circumstances attending,

the overwind which occurred at Markham Colliery, Duckmanton, Derbyshire,

on

30 July 1973

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty

April 1974.

Table of Contents

Report On The Cause Of, And Circumstances Attending, The Overwind Which Occurred At Markham Colliery, Duckmanton, Derbyshire, On 30 July 1973

Date: 6 March, 1974

The Right Honourable Eric Graham Varley, M.P.

Secretary of State for Energy

Sir,

1. In compliance with the direction given by the Right Honourable Peter Walker, M.B.E., M.P., Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, under Section 122 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954, I held a Public Inquiry into the accident at Markham Colliery on 30 July, 1973, which caused the deaths of 18 men and in which another 11 sustained serious bodily injury. One other man was seriously injured during the rescue operations. I now have the honour to submit my report.
2. I opened the Inquiry at Chesterfield Town Hall on 10 October, 1973 and it lasted for six days during which time 55 persons gave evidence. Their names and occupations are given in Appendix I.
3. The interested parties were represented as follows:

The Department of Trade and Industry, Mr. D. Richards, H.M. Senior District Inspector of Mines and Quarries, Mr. L. D. Rhydderch, H.M. Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines and Quarries, Mr. S. Luxmore, H.M. Principal Electrical Inspector of Mines and Quarries, Mr. T. K. Clanzy, H.M. Principal Inspector of Mechanical Engineering in Mines and Quarries.

The National Union of Mineworkers, Mr. P. E. Heathfield, General Secretary, Derbyshire Area, Mr. A. Bulmer, Mining Engineer, Derbyshire Area, Mr. K. H. Saunders, Mining Engineer for the National Union of Mineworkers, Mr. F. Wilks, Regional Officer, No. 4 Region, Colliery Officials and Staffs Association.

The National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers, Mr. K. Moore, Assistant General Secretary, Midland Area, Mr. S. Evans, General Secretary, Midland Area, Mr. F. Roddy, General Treasurer, Midland Area, Mr. C. B. Hopkin, Consultant Mining Engineer, Mr. A. Plummer, Consultant Mechanical Engineer.

The National Coal Board, Dr. H. L. Willett, Deputy Director-General (Mining), Mr. W. J. Currie, Director of Engineering, Mr. R. B. Dunn, Area Director, North Derbyshire Area, Mr. J. H. Northard, Deputy Director (Mining), North Derbyshire Area, Mr. J. N. L. Woodley, Deputy Director, Mining Research and Development Establishment.

The British Association of Colliery Management and The National Association of Colliery Managers Limited, Mr. J. W. Pine, Technical Adviser, Mr. 3. Rodgers, General Manager of Markham Colliery, Mr. G. E. Tyler, General Secretary, Mr. M. A. Fairnie, Regional Organising Secretary, East and West Midlands and North Western Region and Mr. G. L. Amott, Branch Chairman, North Derbyshire Branch, of the British Association of Colliery Management.

4. I find that the 18 men lost their lives and the other 11 sustained serious bodily injury because the cage in which they were travelling in the No. 3 shaft crashed into the pit bottom as a result of an overwind. There was a short delay in reaching the injured men because the cage gates were distorted but despite this the last casualty was brought to the surface just over two hours after the accident. I am satisfied that the evidence given at the Inquiry was sufficiently comprehensive to enable me to determine the cause and circumstances of the overwind. The names of the men who lost their lives and of the injured are given in Appendix II.

Description Of The Colliery

General

5. Markham Colliery is one of 14 producing mines in the North Derbyshire Area of the National Coal Board and is situated near Duckmanton about five miles by road to the east of Chesterfield. At the time of the accident the saleable output was 30,000 tons per week with 1,870 men employed below ground and 425 on the surface.
6. There are four shafts (Plan No. 1 shows their location) arranged in pairs with No. 1 (downcast) and No. 4 (upcast) near the general offices and No. 2 (downcast) and No. 3 (upcast) some 350 yards to the south. Coal winding is confined to Nos. 1 and 2 while Nos. 3 and 4 are used for winding men and materials.
7. At the top of No. 3 shaft there is an Aerex radial flow fan which extracts 238,000 cubic feet of air per minute at 9.8 inches water gauge.

Management

8. The principal officials holding statutory appointments for Markham Colliery including the winding equipment at No. 3 shaft, were:

There were two Deputy Managers, each holding statutory responsibility as Undermanager for a part of the colliery. D. Hotchkiss, the Senior Deputy Manager, was responsible for the surface and No. 3 shaft.

9. Other officials whose responsibility included the winding equipment at No. 3 shaft were:

Winding Equipment At No. 3 Shaft

Shaft and head frame (Plan No. 2)

10. In 1886 No. 3 shaft was sunk to the Deep Soft seam at a depth of 1,626 feet. Subsequently, the lower 189 feet were filled in and the existing pit bottom established at 1,407 feet — the Ell Coal seam level. The shaft is 15 feet diameter and brick lined throughout.
11. There are two double-deck cages each capable of carrying a maximum of 16 persons per deck. Each cage is attached to a 1 1/8 inches diameter locked coil winding rope and guided through the shaft by four I inches diameter half locked coil ropes on the side nearest to the shaft wall. There are two rubbing ropes between the cages and these, together with the guide ropes, are suspended from white metal filled swivel glands in the head frame and tensioned by weights in the shaft sump, In the pit bottom the cages land on wooden baulks set into the shaft walls. On the north side a platform gives access to the top decks so that simultaneous loading or unloading of men can take place.
12. At the shaft top a circular brick tower forms an airlock and supports a steel frame for the detaching bells and the headgear which has back stays to ground level. Steel tie rods from the frame to the brick tower give additional stability. Access to an over wound cage suspended from the detaching bell is provided but there are no head frame catches to support a cage in that position. Either cage can ascend 15 feet 9 inches above the normal decking level before it is detached from the winding rope.

Winding engine

(i) General

13. Plan No. 3 shows a general view of the airlock, No. 3 winding engine house and the motor generator house. It also shows a detailed plan of the engine house and an enlarged view of the winding engineman’s cabin.
14. The 440 horse power Ward Leonard winding engine was supplied by The British Thomson Houston Company Limited, Rugby, with mechanical parts designed and manufactured by Markham and Company Limited of Chesterfield. It was installed at Do Well Colliery, owned by the Staveley Coal and Iron Company Limited in 1921 and transferred to Markham No. 3 shaft about 1930. In 1945, the cylindrical drum was fitted with a centre ring and in 1949 a replacement automatic contrivance of the torque controller type was installed and commissioned by Tudor Auto Services Limited, now Blacks Equipment Limited. In 1952 the original deadweight brake was replaced by the servo-spring brake unit in use at the time of the accident. This was manufactured by S. Briggs and Company Limited and installed by Tudor Auto Services Limited. At the same time a Lockheed hydraulic impulse brake tripping system was installed but this was replaced in 1960 by a Blacks high pressure oil tripping system. In the same year, the 30 hertz (cycles per second) alternating current apparatus was converted to operate from a 50 hertz power supply. In 1961 the number of men permitted to travel in each cage was increased from 24 to 32. Thicker barrel plates and a new centre ring were fitted to the drum in 1963 and the cast iron brake shoes and fulcrum brackets were replaced by mild steel parts in the following year.
15. The engine is used only to wind men, materials and limited quantities of stone and as this duty does not require a predetermined winding cycle for production purposes it is left to the enginemen to regulate the speed and the rates of acceleration.
16. The ropes are attached to the drum by means of white metal sword capels bolted to the drum sides adjacent to the brake paths and when fully wound on are double layered. A new rope has about 11 ‘dead’ coils to allow for recapping.
17. The drum is connected by a solid coupling to a direct current motor (winder motor) which has separately excited field windings and an open loop control system. The armature is supplied by the generator of a Ward Leonard motor generator set driven by an alternating current slip-ring induction motor housed with its associated control equipment in a separate building adjacent to the winding engine house.
18. The speed and direction of rotation of the winder motor are controlled by movement of the engineman’s control lever within a quadrant, which has a middle ‘off’ position. Forward or backward movement of this lever operates electrical contacts, which determine the polarity of the generator field and thus the direction of rotation of the winder motor (Plan No. 4). The lever also operates a rheostat which varies the generator field strength and hence the output voltage of the generator. Except at low speeds the winder motor speed is proportional to voltage for a particular load but for each change in load this proportionality alters.
19. One of the winding enginemen describing a normal wind with an equal number of men in each cage said that after receiving the necessary signals he moves the control lever in the appropriate direction from the ‘off’ position gradually applying power to the winder motor and slowly releasing the mechanical brake. The voltage applied to the motor is then progressively increased to accelerate the winding drum until the indicated voltage reaches 300 to 320, which gives a drum speed of about 40 revolutions per minute and a rope speed of about 20 feet per second (13.6 miles per hour). This speed is maintained until the position of the cages in the shaft corresponds to about 10 drum revolutions (283 feet) from the end of the wind when the generator voltage is gradually reduced by moving the control lever towards the ‘off’ position to increase regenerative braking. This braking is available to reduce speed during a wind and, if there is a descending out-of-balance load, to maintain a selected speed.
20. During regenerative braking, the winder motor, which is then being driven by the load, becomes a generator with an output voltage higher than that of the Ward Leonard generator. This causes the generator to drive the alternating current motor, which in turn becomes an induction generator feeding power back into the colliery supply system thus producing a braking effect on the winding engine. The engineman maintains this braking as the wind continues by progressively reducing the voltage to about 200 at 6½ drum revolutions (184 feet) from the end of the wind, when a warning bell rings. He continues to decrease the voltage and, consequently, the speed of the cages by gradually bringing the control lever to the ‘off’ position. At about four revolutions (113 feet) from the end of the wind he progressively applies the mechanical brake until the cages come to rest. With a heavy out-of-balance load descending the engine is controlled in a similar manner but the mechanical brake is applied earlier.
21. The enginemen estimate the loads in the cages from readings of winder motor current on a centre zero ammeter connected in the main direct current loop (Plan No. 4). When loads in the two cages are similar the starting current is about 800 amperes and this reduces to zero as the cages approach the midpoint of the shaft. As the weight of the descending rope becomes predominant the motor current automatically reverses to produce regenerative braking, the value of braking current being indicated on the opposite side of the ammeter scale. With a maximum out-of-balance load descending the starting current is lower, regenerative braking develops earlier and the magnitude of braking current is greater than that obtained with equal loads in the cages.
22. Although regenerative braking provides an efficient means of reducing the speed of a Ward Leonard winding engine it is only available on the No. 3 winding engine when the electrical systems are operating normally. There is no regenerative braking if the power supply fails, if any of the safety devices operate or if the emergency stop button is pressed.

(ii) Mechanical brake

23. At the time of the accident a Burns Cradle type brake was in use (Plan No. 5). It consisted of a pair of Ferodo lined brake shoes applied to the underside of the brake paths by the action of the compressed spring nest operating through a system of levers. The brake was released by using compressed air to counteract the force of the spring nest and move the brake shoes away from the drum brake path. During normal braking, the winding engineman’s brake lever operated an Iversen type valve which controlled the flow of compressed air to a servo-cylinder.
24. The force from the spring nest was transmitted to the main lever of the brake system by a 2 inches diameter steel rod 8 feet 11 7/8 inches long, located in the centre of the nest, constrained by a plate at the top and connected by a crosshead trunnion to the main lever at the bottom. The piston of the servo-cylinder was connected to the free end of the main lever and when compressed air was admitted to the cylinder this lever was forced down and the brake released.
25. If the power supply failed or any of the safety devices operated, or if the emergency stop button was pressed, the emergency brake solenoid was de-energised and the ‘ungabbing’ gear immediately disengaged the engineman’s brake control lever from the Iversen type valve and caused the mechanical brake to be applied (Plan No. 5). The ‘ungabbing’ gear could not be reset until the brake control lever was returned to the ‘brakes on’ position and the safety circuits were energised.

(iii) Safety equipment

26. The automatic contrivance was a Blacks controller driven from the drum shaft through a system of gears which also drove a vertical pillar type depth indicator showing the position of the cages in the shaft. It was designed to cut off the power supply to the winder motor and cause the mechanical brake to be applied to prevent the cages:

The controller had a centrifugal governor, dial mounted cams and over speed and over wind switches, which operated in conjunction with back-out switches and two electrical safety circuits.

27. One of these circuits, which included the brake solenoid and all the protective features provided by the automatic contrivance, was interlocked with the other — the pilot safety circuit — which has two contactors in parallel. These contactors can be tripped by various safety devices including the winding engineman’s emergency stop button, an over wind switch on the depth indicator, the Ward Leonard over current relay and the slack rope and brake wear switches. The pilot safety contactors have contacts in series with two parallel, connected main safety contactors, which control the supply of electricity to the winder motor and the brake solenoid. The schematic diagrams (Plan No. 4) show that the brake solenoid, pilot safety circuit contactors and the main safety contactors must all be energised to run the winding engine and, therefore, operation of any safety device should cut off the power supply and apply the mechanical brake. Visual indicators in the engineman’s cabin show correct or incorrect operation of the pilot and main safety contactors.
28. Before winding men the engineman operated a lever, which through a linkage, altered the position of one of the cams on the automatic contrivance to enforce lower winding speeds. A switch on the lever gave visual indication to the banksman, onsetter and winding engineman that the lever was set for ‘man winding’ but did not positively prove the position of the cam on the automatic contrivance.
29. A rope speed indicator was installed in the engineman’s cabin adjacent to the ammeter about 13 years ago but the associated tacho-generator was not fitted and the indicator never operated. Further technical details of the winding equipment are given in Appendix III.

The Overwind

30. At about 5.35 a.m. on Monday, 30 July 1973 the dayshift winding engineman, R. W. Kennan, arrived at No. 3 winding engine house as the last of the nightshift men were being wound to the surface. Some 20 minutes later Kennan operated the winding engine to wind the first dayshift men into the mine and by about 6.20 a.m. 105 persons had been lowered.
31. The overlap rope cage (Bolsover side) was then loaded at the surface with 15 men on the top deck and 14 on the bottom deck. The underlap rope cage (Roadway side) was empty. The wind proceeded normally until the cages had passed the mid point in the shaft when Kennan began to retard the engine and, out of the corner of his eye, saw ‘some sparks under the brake cylinder’ and heard a bang. He immediately moved the control lever towards the ‘off’ position to increase regenerative braking and simultaneously pulled the brake lever towards the ‘on’ position. Operation of the brake lever felt ‘the same as picking up a pen’ and had no effect on the speed of the winding engine drum. Kennan continued moving the control lever towards the ‘off’ position but it appeared to him that this had little effect on the drum speed so he pressed the emergency stop button. He expected to see the drum ‘brought to a sudden stop’ but nothing happened and, as a last resort, he switched off the motor for the hydraulic pump which supplied the ‘ungabbing’ gear. This had no effect on the winding engine and the next thing Kennan remembered was bricks falling around him.
32. The ascending cage was detached from the underlap rope by the operation of the detaching hook in the headframe bell but continued to ascend until it struck the roof girders of the airlock structure where it fractured the surrounding concrete and brickwork. As there were no safety catches in the headframe the cage then dropped back until it was hanging by its suspension chains from the detaching hook.
33. The descending cage carrying the men crashed into the pit bottom with such force that it fractured nine of the 17 wooden landing baulks. Although power had been cut off before the crash, the momentum of the winding system unwound the spare coils of overlap rope and then the sword capel, with part of the drum side and brake path, was torn away. The rope and capel were pulled over the headgear pulley and then fell down the shaft on top of and alongside the cage containing the men. The drum continued to rotate and the flailing capel of the underlap rope seriously damaged the winding engine house and an adjoining workshop (Plate 1).

The Recovery

34. It was immediately obvious to the men in the pit bottom that a serious accident had occurred and the onsetter entered his cabin to telephone to the surface while the winding rope was still falling down the shaft. He was unable to obtain an answer to his emergency call on the automatic telephone but spoke to the surface operator on a magneto telephone. The mine emergency organisation was brought into operation with a control centre at the surface.
35. On the north side of the pit bottom some of the tangled winding rope had to be moved aside and there was difficulty in opening the cage gates because their vertical slide rods had been distorted by the crash. Nevertheless, once the gates were opened the removal of casualties proceeded quickly. Injections of morphia were given to the very seriously injured as they lay in the pit bottom before being transported to the surface. Some were brought out through the adjacent No. 2 shaft and to minimise delay others were carried down a steep drift to No. 4 shaft some 700 yards away. The last casualty arrived at the medical centre about two hours after the accident.
36. In the early stages of the recovery there was some delay in sending casualties to hospital but the situation improved when additional ambulances arrived from the County Authority. The mobile emergency winding engine from Mansfield Rescue Station was in position alongside No. 3 shaft about 80 minutes after the accident.
37. J. Maxwell, who that morning had started work at Markham for the first time, was in the pit bottom at the time of the accident and was seriously injured when he fell from the top deck platform while assisting in the recovery.

The Investigation

38. The circumstances of the accident indicated that there had been a complete failure of the winding engine brake and it was found that the centre rod in the spring nest had broken. A short length of this rod and the distance piece were found underneath the brake engine. It was agreed at the colliery that a small group of H.M. Inspectors of Mines and Quarries and National Coal Board Engineers should conduct the investigation and keep the interested parties informed of progress. Concurrent with this witnesses were interviewed.
39. The bottom deck of the cage which crashed on to the landing baulks was severely distorted but there was little damage to the top deck (Plate 2). Speed of impact was subsequently estimated to be 27 miles per hour. The top of the airlock was damaged and there was slight leakage of air but this did not seriously affect the ventilation of the mine. Inspection of the shaft from a hoppit wound by the mobile emergency winding engine revealed no serious damage and the shaft top was then sealed off to facilitate removal of the overwound cage and repairs to the airlock. Before investigation in the engine house could proceed the building had to be made safe and weatherproof.
40. The winding engineman’s brake lever and the control lever were found in the ‘off’ position, the brake lever having moved to this position when released after the brake solenoid was de-energised. The ‘ungabbing’ gear had operated and the compressed air supply was still available at the Iversen type valve. The brake shoes were about 1/8 inch clear of the brake paths, part of the drum side and brake path — where the overlap rope sword capel had been attached — was missing and the underlap rope was fully wound on to the drum with the capel lying in the drum pit. The column type depth indicator had overwound and one of the mounting brackets for the overwind screw on the automatic contrivance had broken due to overtravel of the traverse nut. The cross shaft between the engineman’s brake lever and the Iversen type valve had been bent.
41. The man/coal lever and the associated cam on the automatic contrivance were in the ‘man winding’ position and this was indicated on the signal panel in the engine house.
42. In the motor generator house the 3,300 volts feeder switch had been isolated shortly after the accident occurred and the liquid starter and the circuit breaker for the motor generator set were seen to be in the ‘off’ position. All contactors and relays in the control cubicle were in their normal de-energised position. The exciter overcurrent, Ward Leonard overcurrent, and motor generator overspeed relays had not tripped. Although the circumstances of the accident did not suggest that it had resulted from, or was initiated by, a fault in any of the electrical systems these were carefully examined and tested. No defects were found which might have caused the accident.
43. The automatic contrivance was visually examined and when no defects were apparent in the mechanism it was sent to the manufacturer’s works for thorough examination and test. When the cover was removed at the works it was found that the governor linkage had been displaced in transit because a grub screw in the reversing cam was loose. After this defect had been corrected it was established from the position of the traverse nut that the winding drum had overwound by 16 2/3 revolutions. The contrivance was then tested and the results obtained were similar to those previously recorded by the Area Overwind Testing Engineers.
44. At an early stage of the investigation the broken centre rod was removed from the spring nest and sent to the Safety in Mines Research Establishment for metallurgical examination. A replacement cross shaft and spring nest centre rod were fitted and the brake then operated correctly in response to the engineman’s lever, and also when automatically applied. In a test it was demonstrated that the brake did not always fail safe, in that if the cross shaft lever keys or the pin in the lever above the ‘ungabbing’ gear were removed, the weight of the linkage opened the Iversen type valve and admitted compressed air to release the brake. Three nuts on the brake lever system were loose and these, with a number of keys, had not been made captive.
45. The centre rod appeared to have failed due to fatigue and, therefore, it was decided to investigate the loading and working conditions of a similar rod in service, consequently, the Director of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment was asked to arrange for a technical investigation of the spring nest assembly to be carried out. At the colliery four strain gauges were fitted at 90° to each other on the replacement centre rod as near as possible to the position where the fracture occurred in the original rod. With the winding engine drum stationary, the strains on the surface of the rod were measured with the brake off, when it was applied manually, then automatically and when power was applied to the drum with the brake on. The results of these tests showed that, in addition to the expected direct tensile stresses at the gauge positions, there were substantial stresses due to bending when the brake was operated. On the gauges at right angles to the winding drum shaft the magnitude of the stresses varied to such an extent that on the one furthest from the drum there was a change from tension to compression as the brake was released. Because the origin of these bending effects was not established the complete spring nest assembly was sent to the Safety in Mines Research Establishment for further investigation (Plate 3).
46. In the laboratory the complete spring nest assembly was installed in a test rig and tests were made which accurately simulated operation of the brake. These confirmed that bending was the cause of the alternating stresses in the centre rod. Significant stresses were induced by bending in the lower part of the rod because the main lever was unable to rotate freely about the crosshead trunnion due to excessive friction between the trunnion axles and the bearing surfaces in the main lever (Fig. 1). It was found that if friction at the crosshead trunnion was relieved by forcibly separating the bearing surfaces and inserting lubricant the stresses in the rod caused by bending were significantly reduced. However, after a few operations the lubricant was forced out by the high bearing pressure.
47. Metallurgical examination of the spring nest rod showed that it had failed because of fatigue, where it passed through the distance piece, at a thread 4¾ inches from the bottom end (Fig. 2). There was evidence that three small cracks had existed for some time at this thread and that one of these had propagated to a depth of 1.1 inches before the rod broke (Plate 4). Numerous additional cracks existed in the threaded portion above and below the fracture (Fig. 3). Although small cracks, present in the region of the fracture, were found in the laboratory by the magnetic particle method of non-destructive testing, experiments showed that they would not have been revealed by applying an ultrasonic probe to the top end of the rod while it was installed in the spring nest. However, a saw cut representing a crack which had penetrated the rod to a depth of inch, was detected by an ultrasonic test.
48. All the main links and pins of the brake system were crack detected and minor defects were found, also worn and corroded bearing surfaces showed that lubrication had not been effective but it was concluded that none of these defects was significant to the accident.
49. The broken rod was made from 0.4 per cent carbon steel of good commercial quality with an ultimate tensile strength of 38 tonf/in2 and the mean tensile stress induced by the spring nest at the minimum cross section was 6.2 tonf/in2. Consequently, the static factor of safety was 6.1. However, because of bending, alternating stresses with an amplitude of +6 .6 tonf/in2 were superimposed on the tensile stress. This is far in excess of an appropriate working value of 3.6 tonf/in2 for this type of threaded rod as quoted by Dr. Heywood in his book Designing Against Fatigue. On this basis failure of the rod was inevitable.
50. The results of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment investigation are contained in five comprehensive reports (Appendix IV) which were submitted to the Inquiry and will be published in their ‘Technical Paper’ series.
51. The manager’s scheme for the systematic examination and testing of mechanical apparatus was comprehensive except that no provision had been made for non-destructive testing of the centre rod in the spring nest. The only record of a special inspection of this rod during its life of 21 years was an entry dated 19 February 1961, referring to a visual examination made by the Colliery Mechanical Engineer in post at that time. This stated ‘Examined brake rod in No. 3 Winder. Main Rod on Blacks servo unit nest of springs examined. Mr. Farnsworth’.

Recommissioning Of The Winding Engine

52. After completion of the investigation the winding engine was re-assembled with new spring applied caliper type brakes and a high pressure hydraulic system having duplicate brake solenoids, all supplied by Blacks Equipment Limited. The drum sides were replaced, barrel plates renewed, and a tacho-generator installed to operate the rope speed indicator. A reconditioned automatic contrivance was installed with an independent drive. Commissioning tests were carried out for the previous winding duties and, in addition, it was demonstrated that the winding system could be brought safely to rest by braking on only one brake path. The representatives of the interested parties agreed that normal winding could be resumed on 1 October 1973.

Comments

53. It is necessary to comment on several matters considered at the Inquiry which are important for safe winding and although some of these are not relevant to the accident I consider that they warrant attention.

‘Single line’ components

54. The centre rod in the spring nest is an example of a ‘single line’ component as the safety of the men in the cage was completely dependent upon it. Such components should either be eliminated or so designed as to prevent danger, for example, failure of any ‘single line’ component in a braking system should cause the winding system to be brought safely to rest. Overspeed and overwind protection should not rely on single components, but where this is not possible they should be reliable and monitored to give warning of failure, or, alternatively, they should fail safe. All winding engines which are dependent upon only one brake path should be modified as should those where automatic application of the brakes is dependent on a single solenoid. Furthermore, there should be indication of any electrical fault in a safety circuit which could render it ineffective or, alternatively, the winding engine should be automatically brought to rest if a fault occurs in a safety circuit which would give rise to danger.

Maintenance and tests

55. A similar rod in a brake spring nest at Ollerton Colliery broke on 14 January 1961 and it was stated by P. Wood, Head of Shafts and Winding Section for the National Coal Board, that tests on this rod showed that stresses induced by bending were the cause of failure. Following this incident the Divisional Chief Engineer, National Coal Board, issued an instruction that the centre rod in all Briggs spring nests should be examined. This instruction did not give any guidance as to the nature and frequency of examinations required or to the use of non-destructive tests. Records showed that an external examination of the Markham rod was made on 19 February 1961, but probably because of lack of guidance, it appears that the rod was not removed for complete examination at that time or subjected to non-destructive testing at any time during its life.
56. Laboratory tests on the Markham rod by the magnetic particle method revealed cracks of various dimensions in thread roots on each side of the fracture. Ultrasonic tests, which can be carried out in situ, did not detect these cracks but could have detected one inch or more in depth. The probability of detecting the crack which led to failure by the ultrasonic method would, therefore, have depended on its rate of propagation and the interval between tests.
57. The winding engine was tested by the Area Overwind Testing Engineers every three months and was stated by G. Godfrey, Area Chief Engineer, to have complied with all the statutory requirements. The National Coal Board draft memorandum entitled ‘Testing the Safety Equipment on Drum Winders’ prescribes the manner of testing and draws attention to the commissioning tests, which should be used for reference purposes. These were not available to the Area Overwind Testing Engineers. The loads used for testing were only estimated, and, on occasions, were greater than the equivalent man load. On other occasions no load was used. There was disagreement at the Inquiry between the testing engineers and the winding enginemen regarding the maximum torque applied to the drum during the statutory brake holding tests. Although I am satisfied that the way in which the tests were carried out had no bearing on the accident I consider that the requirements of the Testing Memorandum, which has been in process of development over 15 years, should now be made mandatory. The commissioning test records should be displayed in the engine house so that the results of all statutory tests can be compared. Area Overwind Testing Engineers should be suitably trained and qualified.
58. The loose grub screw found in the automatic contrivance was a potentially dangerous defect which could only have been discovered at the colliery by thorough internal examination, and design of the automatic contrivance should be improved to prevent this type of defect. Automatic contrivances, and the other parts of winding engines which are vital to safety, should be examined by persons with specialised skills, and provision for these examinations should be made in the manager’s scheme of maintenance.

Training of winding enginemen

59. It became evident during the Inquiry that the winding enginemen used different operating techniques and the inconsistencies which resulted indicate a need for review of the training arrangements. The present practice of ‘on the job’ instruction is generally satisfactory but Colliery Engineers should play a more active part in this to ensure that the best methods of control are applied. In addition, a manual should be prepared for each winding engine and, without prejudice to the ability of enginemen to exercise their initiative and judgment, should explain the consequences of operation of the controls and protective devices.

Statutory provisions

60. Neither the Area Mechanical Engineer, the Area Electrical Engineer nor the Colliery Chief Engineer had statutory responsibilities although, in the normal course of their duties, they would issue instructions to the Colliery Engineers who have statutory responsibilities. The view was expressed, and I agree, that the authority of these Engineers would be strengthened if they were appointed under section 1 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 or section 1 of the Mines Management Act 1971. The Area Overwind Testing Engineers should also be statutorily appointed.
61. Section 81 of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954, requires that ‘All parts and working gear, whether fixed or movable, including the anchoring and fixing appliances, of all machinery and apparatus used as, or forming, part of the equipment of a mine, and all foundations in or to which any such appliances are anchored or fixed shall be of good construction, suitable material, adequate strength and free from patent defect, and shall be properly maintained’. It should be considered whether, in the circumstances, there has been a contravention of this section which it would have been practicable to avoid or prevent.
62. Evidence given at the Inquiry showed that the trunnion bearing did not operate as designed and caused fluctuating stresses to be induced in the centre rod of the spring nest which it could not sustain. R. Jeffrey, Senior Scientific Officer, Safety in Mines Research Establishment, said that any crack which had penetrated to a depth of inch could have been detected by ultrasonic tests without removing the rod, but not by visual examination with the unaided eye. There is uncertainty as to the frequency of ultrasonic testing which would have been necessary to discover the main pre-existing crack as its rate of propagation beyond inch could not be established. It appears that the persons at the colliery having responsibility for maintenance had no reason to suspect that the rod was overstressed and, therefore, did not appreciate the need for special methods of testing. Nevertheless, the rod was shown to be of inadequate strength for the stresses induced and the main pre-existing crack could have been found by available means of testing. Also, there was a precedent for this type of failure in a similar rod at Ollerton Colliery in 1961.

National Coal Board Instructions

63. During the investigation it was found that some keys and nuts in the brake system had not been secured in accordance with the requirements of National Coal Board Production Department Instruction PI 1956/10 which has been mandatory for 17 years. Several witnesses expressed the opinion that Production Department Instructions should be re-issued and reviewed periodically to ensure that their requirements are being implemented. I consider that a scheme for this purpose, which has been introduced in one National Coal Board Area, should be extended to all areas.
64. The Colliery Mechanical Engineer was not informed and did not hear about the accident until he was on his way to work at his usual time 1½ hours later. He should have been informed immediately and colliery emergency procedures should be reviewed to ensure that all essential persons are notified.

Other matters

65. There was delay in identifying some of the casualties because their cap lamps and self rescuers were removed during the recovery operation. It was suggested that, to avoid confusion, all persons going underground should wear an identification disc and this is worthy of further consideration.
66. A serious disadvantage of many colliery automatic telephone systems is their inability to select priority calls when the exchange is busy during an emergency. The National Coal Board has developed a system which will give priority to emergency calls and this should be incorporated in existing installations as soon as possible.

Immediate action

67. Centre rods in all spring nests, similar to that involved in the accident, have already been changed and the National Coal Board is carrying out nondestructive tests on winding engine brake components and examining all winding apparatus to:

In addition, schedules of mechanical and electrical examinations are being reviewed and action is being taken to ensure compliance with the requirements of Instruction PI 1956/10.

68. During the Inquiry it became evident that there was an urgent need for a committee of engineers to consider all safety aspects of manriding in shafts and unwalkable outlets and immediately after the Inquiry I met representatives of the interested parties who agreed that a committee should be formed. The names of the persons who have agreed to serve on this committee are given in Appendix V. It is unlikely that the committee can report to me on your behalf before the end of 1974, but the National Coal Board has agreed to implement any interim decisions as the work proceeds.
69. At the first meeting of the committee on 3 December 1973 four subcommittees were formed to consider the engineering aspects of manriding in shafts and unwalkable outlets. Evidence at the Inquiry from H. A. W. Pettinger, Director, Otis Elevator Company Limited, indicated that some aspects of lift practice might be applicable to mining and he, with other representatives from industry, will be invited to serve on the sub-committees.

Conclusions

70. I conclude that:

Recommendations

71. I recommend that:

Acknowledgements

72. I record my sincere thanks for the help and co-operation of the representatives of all parties to the Inquiry and of Mr. K. S. A. Douglas, Clerk to the Court, and Mr. F. Bottom, Court Usher.
73. I am also indebted to all those who were concerned with the preparations for, and the investigations prior to the Inquiry; H.M. Inspectors of Mines and Quarries and the Administrative and Drawing Office staffs of the Department of Energy; the staff of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment; the staff of the National Coal Board and, in particular, Mr. J. E. Fellows, Mr. D. Jones and Mr. F. Brown for the preparation and demonstration of the plans and model, and Mr. V. P. Horswill for the photographs. I am most grateful to the Chesterfield Borough Council and Mr. R. A. Kennedy, the Town Clerk, for making the Council Chamber and other accommodation in the Town Hall available for the Inquiry, and for the help given by the Town Hall staff. I wish to record my thanks to Mr. W. Stansfield, C.B.E., M.C., Q.P.M., the Chief Constable of Derby and County Borough Constabulary and his officers; the staff of the Department of the Environment in Sheffield and Leeds and British Debt Services Limited for the facilities and refreshments which they provided for the Inquiry.
74. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the witnesses and to all who took part in the recovery operation.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

1. W. Calder.

Appendix I

List of witnesses

Appendix II

Names of the men who died or were seriously injured

Appendix III

Technical particulars of the winding apparatus

Appendix IV

Safety in Mines Research Establishment reports

Appendix V

Members of the National Committee for Safety of Manriding in Shafts and Unwalkable Outlets

The post 1973 – Official Report into the Disaster appeared first on The Story Mine.

Two official reports 

Report on the Causes of and Circumstances attending the Explosion which occurred at Markham Colliery, Derbyshire, on the 21st January, 1937

This is the official report into the 21st January 1937 disaster at Markham Colliery which killed 9 men

Report on the causes of and circumstances attending the overwind which occurred at Markham Colliery, Duckmanton Derbyshire on 30th July 1973

This is the official report into the  30th July 1973 disaster at Markham Colliery which killed 18 men

October 13th 2019

Inquest on Thomas Johnson (1895 – 1949) who died on the 9th November 1949 after being crushed by a tub on the surface.

Inquest on John Stevens (1886 – 1950) who died in May 1950 from spinal injuries he suffered in a fall of bind in March 1932. He had been incapacitated for 18 years.

October 12th 2019

Inquest on George Dixon (1892 – 1930) who died on 25th January 1930 after a roof fall in Markham No.2 colliery. John Parsons who was also buried and then tried to save George was commended at the inquest.

Photographs of the following miners have been added to the inquests page:

William Henry Chambers (1888 – 1935)

Harold Morpus (1905 – 1933)

George Platts (1880 – 1933)

Daniel Yarnold (1893 – 1935)

October 11th 2019

Inquest on Walter Goucher (1895 – 1930) who died in the Chesterfield Royal Hospital on the 3rd October 1930, after a serious accident at Markham No. 2 colliery on September 14th 1930.

Inquest on Harry Clay (1903 – 1941) who died on 17th October 1941 after a roof fall at Markham No.1 Colliery.

The post New Content appeared first on The Story Mine.

Arthur, Miriam, Harry, Joan and Aunty Leah

Arthur, Miriam, Harry and Joan

Arthur Carter (right)

The post 1938 – Arthur Carter family photos appeared first on The Story Mine.

The post List of all miners to be commemorated appeared first on The Story Mine.

There are now 61 figures after the latest commemoration as part of the award-winning ‘Walking Together’ memorial – led by us – which will eventually feature 106 figures stretching between the village of Duckmanton near Chesterfield and the former pithead.

Each figure is part of a walking trail which symbolises a miner’s journey to the pit and back home again and represents the 106 men who lost their lives in three disasters at the site.

On 21 January 1937 an underground explosion claimed the lives of nine men and in 1938, 79 miners lost their lives and 40 were seriously injured in a second explosion.

Eighteen miners died and 11 others suffered serious injury in the third disaster at the colliery when the mechanical brake on a lift carrying them to the coalface failed on 30 July, 1973.

The former colliery site has now been reclaimed by us and Henry Boot Developments and is home to the Markham Vale regeneration scheme which is working to create jobs for local people.

Each figure carries a tag with the name of one of the miners, along with their age and job role.

The new figures were dedicated to the following miners who were all killed in the 1938 disaster:

Carter, Arthur. 40, Deputy sponsored by Reds Salon, Post Office and family fundraising

Gregory, Bernard. 34, Timber Drawer sponsored by Waterman Aspen

Kerry, Samuel. 20, Haulage Hand sponsored by AECOM

Lamb, Alfred. 26, Road Layer sponsored by Eileen Cooper

McConnon, John. 26, Rope Greaser sponsored by Henry Boot Construction Limited

Smith, Frank. 26, Belt Trimmer sponsored by The Smith Family

Wale, Herbert. 40, Timber Drawer sponsored by AW Repair Group

and Joseph Birkin, 60, Face Worker who was killed in the 1973 disaster sponsored by CB Arts.

The Walking Together memorial has been designed by Cheshire-based artist Stephen Broadbent.

The memorial won the award for best volunteer project and the Markham Vale Heritage Group was also highly commended recognising the involvement of young people in heritage with its Story Mine project at this year’s Derbyshire Heritage Awards.

Residents can share their memories of Markham Colliery on the Markham Story Mine website.

Anyone interested in sponsoring a figure can contact Head of Markham Vale, Peter Storey by emailing peter.storey@derbyshire.gov.uk or tel: 01629 535417 for more information.

Photos from the event (credit Derbyshire County Council)

The post Markham miners memorial unveiling (16 September 2019) appeared first on The Story Mine.

Wilfred Rodgers of 37, Spital Lane, Chesterfield, where he had lived nearly all of his life, had worked at Markham Colliery for over thirty years.  He saw active service with the Royal Artillery and 8th Army in the famous North Africa campaign of 1942, including the decisive battle at El Alamein.  He returned to Markham after demobilisation.  He was a keen gardener.  He left a widow, a son and a daughter.  Wilfred was cremated in Brimington. 

Wilfred was commemorated on 10 December 2020. The location of the artwork can be found in zone 8 on the trail map which can be downloaded here.

You can watch a short commemorative film here.

Derbyshire Times.

Mr. Wilfred Rodgers (59) of 37, Spital Lane, Chesterfield, had worked at Markham Colliery for over 30 years. He saw active service with the 8th Army in the famous North Africa campaign of 1942, including the decisive battle at El Alamein. He returned to Markham after demobilization. He leaves a widow, a son and a daughter. Cremation is today at 2.30 p.m. at Chesterfield.

Research by Sandra Struggles:

Wilfred Rodgers was a Ripper at Markham Colliery. He lived at 37 Spital Lane, Chesterfield  where he had lived nearly all of his life. He served with the Royal Artillery and 8th Army.

He was a keen gardener.

Further Information

Markham Colliery 1973 disaster

List of miners killed in the 1973 disaster.

If you have any information to contribute to the research please contact us. 

The post 1973 – Rodgers, Wilfred appeared first on The Story Mine.

Mr. Albert Tyler of 107, Church Lane, Calow, had spent fifty years working in the pits of the area.  He was born at Holmewood and started working at Holmewood Colliery after leaving school.  A move to Glapwell was followed by a transfer to Markham Colliery  where he worked for eighteen years.  Albert had been married for forty-one years and left a widow, a son, a daughter, and two grandchildren.  Albert was the oldest miner to be killed in the three disasters and was amongst the first of the 106 miners to be commemorated in recognition of being the oldest miner killed.  He was cremated at Brimington. 

Albert was commemorated on 30th July 2013. The location of the artwork can be found in zone 3 on the trail map which can be downloaded here.

Derbyshire Times.

Mr. Albert Tyler (64), 107, Church Lane, Calow, had spent 50 years working in the pits of the area. He was born at Holmewood and started working at Holmewood Colliery on leaving school. A move to Glapwell was followed by a transfer to Markham Colliery 18 years ago. He was a development worker.

Mr Tyler had been married for 41 years and leaves a widow, a son, a daughter, and two grandchildren.

Albert (64) was the oldest miner to be killed in the three disasters, while Arthur Brown (18) was the youngest. Both Albert and Arthur were the first of the 106 miners to be commemorated in recognition of being the oldest and youngest miner killed in the three disasters.

Further Information

Markham Colliery 1973 disaster

List of miners killed in the 1973 disaster.

If you have any information to contribute to the research please contact us. 

The post 1973 – Tyler, Albert appeared first on The Story Mine.

Charles Leonard Sissons of 79 Grangewood Road, Chesterfield had worked at Markham for eight years, moving there when Holmewood Pit closed.  An accident which crushed his thumb meant he had to give up work on the coal face and he took a job as a road repairer.  He was the grandson of Charles William Beddingham who was crushed by tubs at Markham Colliery in November 1930.  His nephew, James Reddish, was badly injured in the disaster.  Charles left his widow Elizabeth, daughters Carol aged fifteen, Lynda aged twelve and son Anthony aged four. Charles was buried at Boythorpe cemetery. 

Charles was commemorated on 22nd September 2016. The location of the artwork can be found in zone 19 on the trail map which can be downloaded here.

Information collated from Derbyshire Times article and research by Sandra Struggles

Charles Leonard Sissons

Road repairer, aged 43 years, of 79 Grangewood rd, Chesterfield.

Charles had worked at Markham for eight years, moving there when Holmewood Pit closed. An accident which crushed his thumb meant he had to give up work on the coal face and he took a job as a road repairer.

He did not want to go to work on that Monday, the day of the disaster, because he was still in shock from the tragic death of his friend at Markham. Stanley Young, who died from being hit on the head when a heavy rock support gave way only a few days before, and Monday was the day of his funeral. In the end Charles went to work.

Charles was married and left his widow Elizabeth, daughters Carol aged 15, Lynda aged 12 and son Anthony aged 4.

Charles was buried at Boythorpe cemetery. His nephew, James Reddish, was badly injured in the disaster.

He was the grandson of Charles William Beddingham who was crushed by tubs at Markham Colliery in November 1930. The inquest on the death of Charles William Beddingham is on the Inquests Page.

More information to follow

Further Information

Markham Colliery 1973 disaster

List of miners killed in the 1973 disaster.

If you have any information to contribute to the research please contact us. 

The post 1973 – Sissons, Charles Leonard appeared first on The Story Mine.

George Clarence Briggs of 264, Spital Lane, Chesterfield, was born in Duckmanton and had spent all his working life at Markham.  He was a keen snooker player and golfer.  He had been a Deputy for about six years and on the day of the accident George and his friend Dennis Stone should have been on day release at College but it was closed and so they went to work.  Dennis Stone survived.  George’s brother, Roy worked in the Area Workshops and was one of the first on the rescue party.  George left his widow Sheila and daughter Pat.  He was cremated at Brimington.

Clarence was commemorated in July 2020. The location of the artwork can be found in zone 11 on the trail map which can be downloaded here.

 You can watch a short commemorative film here.

Derbyshire Times.

Mr. Clarence Briggs, of 264, Spital Lane, Chesterfield, had spent all his working life at Markham and was promoted to a deputy six years ago. He had just returned to work after the pit’s annual holiday. Apart from work he was a keen snooker player and golfer. He is survived by his wife Sheila and daughter Pat.

He was born at Duckmanton and had lived at his present home at Spital Lane, Chesterfield, for 15 years.

Further Information

Markham Colliery 1973 disaster

List of miners killed in the 1973 disaster.

If you have any information to contribute to the research please contact us. 

The post 1973 – Briggs, Clarence appeared first on The Story Mine.